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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
eral different plans, the one most suitable being carried
out, and this being the one upon which any compensation
would be based. We are therefore eliminating from your
statement the item of $225.00 for plan No. 1, which was
never executed. (we) decline to consider the first item
of thins charge."
Said the court. " when respondent accepted the check with
the conditions under which it was tendered, he must be deemed
to be bound by those conditions."
Although the facts in the case of First National Bank v. White-
Dvianey Company54 are not entirely clear on the point, the condi-
tion there was apparently in the form of an oral statement, by the
debtor as the check was handed to the creditor's representative,
that the check was in full settlement of the account. And in
Northern Bank & Trust Company v. Harmon"l a condition was
found in the fact that the debtor's remittance "was paid to the
(creditor's) then attorneys as a tender of full payment and satis-
faction.'* HAROLD SHEPHRD.*
WARREN SHATTUCK. " *
"Note 40,"supra.
Note 26, supra.
*To be continued.
**Dean of the Law School, University of Washington.
***Member of the senior class in the Law School, University of Wash-
ington and President of the Student Editorial Board of the WASHINGTON
LAW REv Ew. This article was written by Mr. Shattuck in the course of a
research study under the direction and supervision of Dean Harold
Shepherd.
The American Law Institute's Restatement of the
Law of Contracts with Annotations to
the Washington Decisions*
Chapter 5
DUTIES AND RIGHTS WHERE MORE PERSONS THAN
ONE ARE PROMISORS OR PROMISEES OF THE
SAME PERFORMANCE**
Section 117. DuTY oF A JOINT PROMISOR, JOINDER OF CO-
PR0MIS0RS.
Each person bound by a joint promise is bound for the
whole performance thereof, but by making appropriate
objection can prevent recovery of judgment against him
unless there are joined as defendants all promisors who
were originally jointly bound with him, except such of
them as are at the time of suit dead or beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the court.
*The absence of annotations to particular sections of the Restatement
indicates that no Washington decisions have been found on the principle
therein stated.
**Continued from last issue.
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Section 118. JUDGMENT IN AN ACTION ON A JOINT PROMISE.
In an action on a joint promise the judgment must be
for or against all the defendants who were originally joint-
ly bound unless judgment against one or more of the de-
fendants is precluded by
(a) death, or
(b) lack of jurisdiction, or
(c) contractual incapacity, or
(d) a discharge in bankruptcy, or
(e) a discharge or barring of the remedy by the Statute
of Limitations.
In any of these cases judgment may be given for or
against the others.
Comment
a. Any number less than all those jointly bound by a promise
may be successfully sued without the others, unless proper objec-
tion is taken to the non-joinder (see Section 117), but with the
exceptions stated in the present section, if the facts appear, though
no formal objection is raised by the parties to a different course,
judgment in an action on such a promise must be for or against all
those joint obligors who are made defendants.
ANNOTATION
In a suit against partners upon their implied contract, where only one
of the partners was served with process, it is proper, under Bal. Code,
Sec. 4881, to enter a judgment against all the partners conditioned that
it be enforceable against the partnership property and the separate prop-
erty of the defendant served, Lzwnfgstone v. Lovegren, 27 W' 102, 67 P.
599 (1902) and in an action for rent against the executor of a
deceased joint lessee and the surviving lessee, the latter not having been
served with process, it is not error to enter judgment against the executor
alone where there was no evidence that the defendants had any joint
property within the state, notwithstanding Rem, and Bal. Code, Sec. 236,
authorizes in such case entry of judgment against both defendants, en-
forceable against their joint property only, Brownfieldf v. Holland, 63 W
86, 114 P 890 (1911). However, where judgment is rendered againstjoint promisees on a joint promise, the judgment must bind them equally.
The liability of partners for the wages of an employee is joint and recov-
ery cannot be had in one sum against one partner and in another sum,
or the same sum, against another partner, but verdict should be against
both partners for the reasonable value of the services, Panos v. Manthon,
141 W 126, 250 P 953 (1926) Under Rem. Comp. Stat., See. 236, an
action upon a joint partnership contractual obligation may be maintained
against one of the partners and judgment entered against him alone,
where neither the partnership, nor either of the other two partners, both
non-residents, one of whom was deceased, had any property within the
state, Halverstadt v. Estus, 160 W 390, 295 P 175 (1931).
Section 119. WHEN JUDGMENT AGAINST OR IN FAVOR OF ONE
PROMISOR DISCHARGES THE DUTY OF CO-PROMISORS.
(1) A judgment rendered by a court of competent juris-
diction within the United States against one or more joint
promisors, or against one or more joint and several prom-
isors, upon a joint promise, discharges the joint duty of the
other joint promisors.
(2) A judgment by such a court in favor of one or more
of such promisors, unless based on
(a) lack of jurisdiction, or
(b) contractual incapacity, or
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(c) a discharge in bankruptcy, or
(d) a discharge or barring of the remedy by the Statute
of Limitations,
discharges the joint duty of the other joint promisors.
(3) The several duty of a promisor who is severally, or
jointly and severally bound with others is not discharged
by judgment for or against one or more of the others.
Comment
a,. The rules stated m the first and second Subsections have been
changed by statute m many States.
ANNOTATION
Subsection (1). Washington cases accord with Section 119, Subsection(1). Where, in an action against all of the members of an unincorpor-
ated society, jointly and severally liable, a several judgment is entered
against all of the defendants served with process, but no judgment is
entered, as authorized by Rem. and Bal. Code, Sec. 236, against all of the
defendants, including those not served, a summons, after judgment, upon
an unserved defendant to show cause why he should not be bound by the
judgment, will not lie, under Rem. & Bal. Code, Sec. 436, such procedure
being available only when a joint judgment has been entered binding thejoint property of all, Nolan v. McNamee, 82 W 585, 144 P 904 (1914)
and a judgment against one partner upon a contract which is joint
only is a bar to any action therein against partners who were not parties
to the suit, Warren v. Rickes, 129 W. 443, 225 P. 422 (1924).
Section 120. WHEN PART PAYMENT RECEIVED FROm ONE
PROISOR OPERATES IN FAVOR OF CO-PROinISORS.
(1) Full or partial performance of his contractual duty
by one promisor severally, or jointly, or jointly and sever-
ally bound for that performance, terminates to the extent
of the performance received the right of the person receiv-
ing the performance to enforce for his own benefit the
promises of the other promisors.
(2) Full or partial satisfaction by any method of the con-
tractual duty of one joint, or joint and several promisor,
satisfies to the same extent the duties of all the promisors.
(3) In the absence of an agreement in specific terms to
the contrary the amount or value of any consideration
received
(a) as satisfaction m full or in part of the duty of one or
more promisors severally bound, or
(b) for a promise of permanent forbearance to enforce
in full or in part the duty of one or more promisors
severally, or jointly, or jointly and severally bound,
terminates to the extent of that amount or value the right
of the person receiving the consideration to enforce for his
own benefit the promises of the other promisors.
Comment
a. A distinction must be taken between receipt of actual per-
formance of a duty, and an agreement to accept satisfaction in some
form other than that which the promiser originally undertook to
give. The effect of this distinction when applied respectively to
several, joint, and joint and several promisors appears from the
section.
b. Subsection (1) states that performance whether full or par-
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tial (as distinguished from an agreed substituted performance)
terminates the right of the person receiving the performance
against the other promisors to the same extent that it terminates
the right against the promisor who rendered the performance. It
is immaterial whether the co-promisors promise severally or jointly,
or jointly and severally As is stated in Chapter 6, not only the
promisee but a beneficiary of the promisee may have the right to
enforce it. Consequently the section is applicable to persons,
whether they are promisees or beneficiaries, who have the right to
receive the performance which has been rendered.
Comment on Subsectwn (2)
c. The idea of unity in a joint duty involves the consequence
that performance, payment, or accord and satisfaction of the duty
of one promisor destroys the duty of all. Similarly partial satis-
faction of the duty of one joint promisor satisfies to the same
extent the duty of all. If the payment or satisfaction is by a surety
or co-surety, he may not only have a right of indemnity or of con-
tribution, but if he fully performs may by subrogation enforce the
joint duty against the other joint contractors. This right, how-
ever, is that of the surety, and the person originally entitled to per
formance cannot even though professing to act as a fiduciary for
the surety maintain an action.
Comment on Subseetwtn (3)
d. It is possible for a promisee to make an agreement in specific
terms with one of several promisors each of whom is bound for the
same performance, that a payment or performance made by him
which differs from that originally promised, shall not be taken in
whole or in partial discharge of the duty but shall merely terminate
or limit the right of the person receiving the payment to enforce
the several duty of that promisor. Under the rule stated in Sub-
section (1) even such an agreement cannot have this effect if all
or part of what was originally promised is given, and as stated in
Subsection (2) even where substituted performance is accepted as
full or partial satisfaction, all joint or joint and several promisors
are discharged to the same extent that any one of them is. But
where the duties of the promisors are only several it is possible
to make a settlement with one of them for substituted performance
without thereby diminishing the creditor's rights against the oth-
ers. Though this is legally possible, an inference should not be
drawn that the duty of one promisor only is to be affected, unless
circumstances clearly require that conclusion. Therefore unless
there is express agreement that payment or satisfaction shall
merely affect the duty of one, it is inferred that the performance
dtue from all is limited. This is stated in Clause (a)
e. The same arguments are applicable to cases where a creditor
has contracted to forbear permanently to enforce his claim against
one promisor. Though the creditor may make such a contract and
bargain that the consideration received for so doing shall not
diminish his claim against the other promisors, the inference in
the absence of proof to the contrary should be that whatever the
creditor receives diminishes the original debt pro tanto. Unlike
the case of accord and satisfaction, a contract even for permanent
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forbearance may be made with one joint promisor without affect-
ng the duty of the others (see Section 121), so that Clause (b) of
Subsection (3) is applicable to joint and joint and several prom-
isors as well as to several promisors, while Clause (a) relates only
to several promisors.
ANNOTATiON
Subsection (3) (a). Where a firm of contractors entered into an
agreement to indemnify their surety against loss, and one of the partners
at the same time deposited $1,000 with the surety as additional security,
the liability of that partner is not limited to the $1,000 but each partner
is liable to the surety for any balance due to it in excess of said sum,
Empire State Surety Go. . Ballov, 66 W 76, 118 P. 923 (1911)
Section 121. EiECT OF DISCHARGE AND OF CONTRACT NOT
TO SUE A JOINT PROMISoR ON THE DUTY OF A CO-PROMISOR.
(1) Where the obligee of a joint contractual promise dis-
charges a promisor by release, rescission or accord and
satisfaction, the other joint promisors are thereby dis-
charged.
(2) Where such an obligee contracts not to sue a joint
promisor, the other joint promisors are not discharged ex-
cept in the cases and to the extent required by the law of
suretyship.
comment
a. A discharge of one or more of a number of pronsors bound
for the same performance may affect the other promisors by virtue
of the rules governing joint promiors or by virtue of the rules
governing principal and surety Only the first of these two sets
of rules is dealt with in this Chapter. It may be said, however,
that a surety whether bound merely severally, or jointly, or joint-
ly and severally, may be discharged m whole or in part if the
creditor deals with the principal debtor, knowing that he is such,
to the prejudice of the surety
b. The word obligee as used m the Section, and in Sections 123,
128-132, includes not only a pronsee but any beneficiary who un-
der the rules of Sections 133-145 has the right to enforce a promise.
ANNOTATION
Subsection (1). Release of the estate of a deceased joint guarantor of
a note, through failure of the holder to present a claim therefor to the
probate court administering the deceased's estate, being brought about
not by any affirmative act of the holder, does not release a co-guarantor,
or his estate, Donnerberg v. Oppenheimer, 15 W 290, 46 P. 254 (1896)
where the obligee of a contract guaranteed by a number of co-guaran-
tors compromised with some of them by accepting money and notes from
them individually and surrendered the guaranteed contract and other
valuable considerations, a guarantor sued upon his note given in such
settlement is estopped from denying liability in the note by reason of
release of his co-guarantors, Simonds v. Noiand, 142 W 423, 253 P. 638
(1927).
Section 122. EFFECT OF RESERVATION OF OBIGEES'S RIGHTS
AGAINST Co-PRoMisoR.
Written or oral words of a person entitled to enforce a
promise which purport to discharge the promisor but ex-
pressly to reserve rights against other promisors jointly
bound for the same performance do not operate as a dis-
charge of the promisor but only as a promise not to sue him,
except that a written discharge cannot be varied by an
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accompanying oral statement or agreement that rights
against other promisors are reserved.
Comment
a. Words which, if taken literally, purport to discharge a joint
promisor are repugnant to words which purport to reserve rights
against other joint promisors, since, if one of them is discharged,
it necessarily follows that the others are. A similar principle is
applicable where co-promisors, whether jointly bound or not, are
principal and surety Words which purport to discharge the prin-
cipal are repugnant to words which purport to reserve rights
against the surety In both these cases the nearest approach that
can be made to giving effect to the expressed intention is to interpret
the words as a promise not to sue (instead of a release or dis-
charge), coupled with a reservation of rights against co-debtors.
This interpretation is given to the words whether they are written
or oral, except that where the words of release or discharge are
written and the attempted reservation of rights is oral, the parol
evidence rule precludes effect being given to the attempted reser-
vation. Whether words which are interpreted as a promise not to
sue areoperative as a contract depends on the existence of the
requisites for the formation of a contract as stated in Sections
19-95.
b. The word discharged is a general word covering all methods
by which legal duty is extinguished. It does not include a contract
not to sue or an unexecuted accord.
ANNOTATION
A release by the holder of a promissory note of one of its joint makers,
coupled with a reservation of the holder's rights against the remaining
parties liable therein, does not release the original payee who had sold
and indorsed the note, except pro tanto, Dams v. Gutheil, 87 W 596, 152
P 14 (1915).
Section 123. DISCHARGE OF A JOINT AND SEVERAL PROMISOR.
Where the obligee of joint and several contractual prom-
ises discharges a promisor by release, rescission or accord
and satisfaction, the other promisors are thereby discharged
from their joint duty, but not from their several duties,
except in the cases and to the extent required by the law of
suretyship.
Comment
a. The rule stated in the Section follows the analogy of the rule
governing judgments. A judgment against one joint and several
debtor does not discharge the other debtors from their several
duties.
b. The statements with reference to suretyship in the Comment
to Section 122 are applicable also to this Section.
ANNOTATION
This Section is contra to North Pacsfic Mortgage Co. v. Krewson, 129
W 239, 224 P 566 (1924), which held that the release of three of six joint
and several makers of a promissory note releases all.*
*The annotations to this Chapter were prepared in memorandum form
by the late Professor Harvey Lantz of the University of Washington Law
School. His notes were arranged for publication by Dean Harold Shepherd
and Warren Shattuck.
